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Emerging Economy MNEs: 
How does home country munificence matter? 
 
Abstract 
 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies (EEs) are establishing 
operations in advanced economies (AEs), apparently departing from traditional 
models of internationalization. We explore an under-explored difference between 
EE MNE and their AE counterparts concerning their country of origin: EEs have 
less munificent business environments. This leads EE MNEs to make different 
location choices than AE MNEs when entering AEs, specifically because they are 
more deterred by barriers to entry.  We therefore predict EE MNEs to be relatively 
more deterred by distance and weak intellectual property protection and relatively 
more attracted by diaspora of migrants and by markets. Our empirical results are 
consistent with these predictions. 
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Introduction 
Historically, foreign direct investment (FDI) was undertaken primarily by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) from advanced economies (AE) investing in other AEs or in emerging 
economies (EEs) (Dunning, 1998). Yet, there has been rapid growth in investment by 
MNEs from EEs, up from 17% of outward FDI flows in 2007 to 36% in 2014 (UNCTAD, 
2012; 2016). While many of these investments have been in other emerging markets, a 
significant and highly publicised proportion of this outward FDI has been invested in 
locations more developed than their country of origin (Cui and Aulakh, 2018). Leading 
theories of MNEs focus on explaining FDI inflows into similarly or less advanced 
environments (Dunning, 1993), which raises the question of how theories may have to be 
adapted to explain EE MNEs entering AEs (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014).  
This study compares the determinants of location choice by MNEs from EEs against 
those of MNEs from AEs.  The theory of the MNE suggests that location decisions depend 
on the interaction of the firm’s own capabilities with the specific locational advantages of 
potential hosts (Alcácer, Denzsö, & Zhao, 2013; Dunning, 1998; Nielsen Asmussen & 
Weatherall, 2017). However, investment by EE MNEs into AEs appears to challenge this 
view (Hennart, 2012, Ramamurti, 2012, Luo & Tung, 2007). Specifically, when they invest 
in AEs, EE MNEs have fewer capabilities suitable for exploitation in these new locations 
than their AE competitors (Lu, Liu, Wright & Filatotchev, 2014; Ramamurti, 2012; 
Verbeke & Kano, 2015). We propose that these deficiencies largely arise from specific 
shortcomings of the home country business environments; its resource munificence.  
Our argument is based on the notion that the home economy in EEs provides less 
support in terms of access to resources, market size and institutions than is the case in AEs. 
Thus, while all MNEs have tangible and intangible assets that they can leverage 
internationally, country of origin deficiencies place EE MNEs at a disadvantage relative to 
AE MNEs. This means that EE MNEs face a greater liability of foreignness when entering 
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AEs (e.g. Klossek, Linke & Nippa, 2012). We argue that these home country disadvantages 
lead EE MNEs to be relatively more deterred by barriers to entry, or more attracted by their 
absence, in a potential host economy.    
A variety of deficiencies in the munificence of the home country limit EE MNEs when 
they start to internationalize (Luo & Wang, 2012; Meyer & Thaijongrak, 2013; Ramamurti, 
2012). For example, they face shortages of outward-oriented business networks (Manolova, 
Manev, & Gyoshev, 2010; Musteen, Datta, & Francis, 2014) and of intermediaries for the 
gathering, analysing and disseminating intelligence about global markets as well as of 
managers experienced in operating in AEs (Leung, 2014; Meyer & Xin, 2018; Wang, Luo, 
Lu, & Maksimov, 2014). Many of these resources are based on tacit knowledge and 
therefore cannot be bought in the market place. This leads EE MNEs to make different 
location choices than AE MNEs when entering AEs, specifically they are more deterred by 
barriers to entry.   
We develop four hypotheses about the relationship between aspects of the host 
economy: that EE MNEs will be relatively more deterred by host economy distance and 
weak IPR protection and relatively more attracted to countries with larger migrant diaspora 
and greater market size. We construct a unique firm-level dataset which allows us to 
compare the FDI location choices in AEs by MNEs from AEs against those from EEs. Our 
empirical tests provide evidence in favour of our hypotheses. Specifically, the direction of 
the effects of key explanatory variables is the same for MNEs from both EEs and AEs, but 
there is evidence of greater deterrence by barriers to entry, and attraction for positive host 
economy characteristics, for EE MNEs than AE MNEs.   
We offer the following contributions to the literature. First, we develop a theoretical 
argument that integrates the resource munificence of the home economy with theories of 
location choice to explain the pattern of EE MNEs outward investments. To achieve this, 
we extend the liability of foreignness concept to the country of origin, to explain why EE 
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MNEs find it more challenging than AE MNEs to overcome barriers.  We provide a 
powerful explanation of EE MNEs investment into AEs and resolve apparent contradictions 
noted in the recent literature. This allows us to address a pertinent question in the IB 
literature (e.g. Hennart, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo & Zhang, 2016): do we need a new 
theory to explain EE MNEs? Our answer is that we do not; rather we need to incorporate 
home country munificence into the existing models.  
Second, we make a number of empirical contributions. Our novel dataset provides 
insights on location choices by MNEs from both AEs and EEs into AEs, specifically 
identifying important differences in the pattern of determination of location choice between 
AEs and EEs that arise from the greater liability of foreignness of EE MNEs. Finally, we 
document and interpret more finely grained results for individual countries of origin, which 
enables us to critically evaluate the generalizability of our findings.  
Theorizing about Emerging Economy Multinationals 
A challenge to theory? 
The theory of the MNE suggests that firms engage in outward FDI to transfer and exploit 
their capabilities (Buckley & Casson, 2009; Narula & Verbeke, 2015). Yet recent empirical 
studies highlight that the recent wave of EE MNEs lacks the famous brands and leading-
edge technologies that are usually viewed as the principal drivers of MNEs’ overseas 
expansion (e.g. Mathews, 2006; Kim et al., 2014; Klossek et al., 2012; Luo & Wang, 2012).  
In particular, EE MNEs tend to operate with comparatively older technologies, labor 
rather than technology intensive processes, and with brands that have limited appeal beyond 
their country of origin (Rugman & Nguyen, 2014; Verbeke & Kano, 2015). Moreover, due 
to their relatively short history of international operations, they have not yet build up 
international management capabilities grounded in experience of managing international 
operations in a variety of host countries (Meyer & Xin, 2018; Wang et al., 2014). Thus, EE 
MNEs enter the global stage with different types of resources than AE MNEs. Indeed EE 
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MNEs have been argued to have developed capabilities to cope with the particular 
conditions of an EE and while these can support internationalization, this is primarily to 
other EEs but not AEs (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Verbeke & Kano, 2015).
1
   
Home countries in the theory of the MNE 
We focus on country of origin effects and propose that the range of capabilities that an 
MNE can exploit differs between AE MNEs and EE MNEs. Focusing on emerging 
economies, Hobdari, Gammeltoft, Li & Meyer (2017) model the relationship between home 
country resource munificence and institutions and link these first to the domestic business 
eco-system and then to outward investment strategies. They propose that interactions 
between firms in the home economy affects internationalization because companies in a 
given country of origin share resources, coordinate actions and serve as each other’s role 
models. Strategies of outward investment thus reflect the competition and collaboration in 
their home country business eco-system. This argument is summarized in Figure 1.  
 insert Figure 1 here  
The OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993) suggests that MNEs possess some ownership 
advantages that allow them to overcome the liabilities of foreignness associated with 
operating in unfamiliar host business contexts. We argue that this proposition applies 
equally to AE and EE MNEs, and thus EE MNEs must possess some source of competitive 
advantage. However, these ownership advantages are subject to country of origin effects 
(Narula, 2012). In particular, as indicated in Figure 1, international management expertise is 
developed interdependently between the national economy, the business eco-system and the 
enterprise itself.  
                                                 
1
 For example, EE MNEs may possess capabilities in ‘process innovations’ to lower costs without 
reducing quality (Zeng & Williamson, 2007), and ‘frugal innovation’. Other EE MNEs develop 
capabilities in managing labor-intensive manufacturing processes (Ramamurti, 2012; Williamson, 
Ramamurti, Fleury & Fleury, 2013), or “the ability to manage institutional idiosyncrasies” (Henisz, 
2003, also see Carney, Dielemann & Taussig, 2016). These capabilities however are likely to be of 
limited value in AE contexts. 
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The national economy provides the fundamental resources, capabilities and institutions 
upon which firms can draw. Critical among these for MNEs are the education system 
including the levels of attainment of, for example, technical, managerial and language 
skills; the financial system with its implications on the cost of domestic as against foreign 
capital; and the property rights system, notably the structure of corporate governance and 
regulation (Gugler, Mueller, Peev, & Segalla, 2013). In home economies with low resource 
munificence, MNEs seeking to internationalise may find it difficult to recruit trained or 
competent managers for their overseas subsidiaries; finances for global expansion
2
 or 
governance structures to prevent management from seeking (domestic) private benefits 
rather than international opportunities (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen & Nielsen, 2016). We 
develop these arguments below. 
Further, the internationalisation process has public good properties, the importance of 
which depends on the munificence of the home country environment and its business eco-
system (Hennart, 2009; Gugler, et al, 2013); hence firm internationalization is 
interdependent with the internationalization of other actors in the home environment. 
Experience in operating in international environments critically facilitates the assessment of 
opportunities and risks, and reduces the marginal costs of further entries (Buckley, Elia & 
Kafouros, 2015; Clarke, Tamaschke, & Liesch, 2012). Such experience can to some extent 
be shared within business networks, especially in networks of companies from the same 
origins (Belderbos et al., 2011; Manolova et al., 2010; Tan & Meyer, 2011). Hence, the 
munificence of the home environment is critical for internationalising firms.  
Emerging economies as MNE home countries 
We propose that for the most part, the resource munificence is weaker in EEs than in 
AEs, and that this has implications for strategic decisions of MNEs from respectively EEs 
                                                 
2
 In fact, some home countries may provide EE MNEs preferential access to national resources 
(Hennart, 2012; Narula, 2012), notably to financial resources (Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2008) and to 
network relationships (Musteen et al., 2014; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2011). This may reduce 
differences between AE and EE MNEs. 
7 
 
and AEs. Specifically, while all MNEs have ownership advantages to help them overcome 
their liability of foreignness in host economies, these will be less marked for MNEs from 
EEs than AEs (Klossek et al., 2012; Narula, 2012). Thus, all MNEs face barriers to entry in 
their host economies, and seek resources that help them to exploit their particular ownership 
advantages. The impact of home country munificence is to exacerbate those barriers to 
entry, or to enhance those attractors. Hence, in our hypothesizing and subsequent empirical 
work we explore ways in which, EE MNEs’ location choices are driven by their lesser 
ability to overcome their liability of foreignness, and their need to exploit more intensively 
their more limited areas of advantage. 
EE business environments are normally less munificent in three aspects that 
fundamentally affect FDI location decisions: knowledge-based resources, international 
management capabilities and networks. First, ownership advantages enable firms to achieve 
competitive advantages in different national contexts (Dunning, 1993). International 
business research has emphasized in particular technological and marketing capabilities as 
basis for ownership advantages (Anand & Kogut, 1997; Rugman, 2009). However, the 
home environment in EEs normally provides less support for the development of world-
leading technologies and internationally recognized brands that could be exploited in AEs 
(Luo & Wang, 2012). For example, deficiencies in the education system and in public (and 
private) administration result in weaknesses of human capital formation in EEs, including 
narrower portfolios of technological capabilities (Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2012).  
Second, international management capabilities enable firms to identify and implement 
cross-border business opportunities. This includes capabilities such as cross-cultural 
management (Bird & Mendenhall, 2016), global strategic thinking and global leadership 
(Caligiuri, 2006; Stahl et al., 2012). It includes capabilities in utilizing location-specific 
resources (Zaheer & Nachum, 2011) and the ability of home country business units to 
absorb knowledge from overseas operations (Ambos, Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2006; 
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Cuervo-Cazurra & Rui, 2017; Kotabe, Jiang & Murray, 2011). These capabilities are 
embedded in people and organizations and, since they are to a high degree based on 
experiential knowledge (e.g. Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick & Forsans, 2016). Especially a 
lack of experience with processes and practice of international management raises barriers 
to entry in ‘foreign’ locations (Clarke, et al., 2012). 
When EE firms extend beyond national borders, they typically face a national shortage 
of individuals and managerial teams with experience of operating in AEs (Arp, 2014; 
Meyer & Xin, 2018). In consequence, EE MNEs typically lack, for example, cultural 
sensitivity for managing international branding; human resource management practices for 
managing highly skilled labor forces (such as research or creative workers); and a corporate 
culture supporting flat managerial structures and culturally diverse teams (Bird & 
Mendenhall, 2016).  
Third, MNEs learn and grow through interactions within business networks, and 
especially EE MNEs often internationalize within such networks (Hertenstein, et al., 2016; 
Lin, Peng, Yang & Sun, 2009; Musteen et al., 2014; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2011). 
Hence, patterns of existing networks to a large extent influence the location choices of firms 
at early stages of internationalization (Alcácer, et al., 2015; Tan & Meyer, 2011), and the 
absence of such networks becomes a major constraint. 
International management requires the gathering, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence about global markets. AEs have often been global players for decades (or even 
centuries), and at the country level have developed stocks of experiential capital and 
knowledge through business networks, administrative structures (e.g. for diplomacy), 
educational institutions and market intermediaries that support international activities of the 
domestic business community (e.g. Jones & Khanna, 2006).
 
Furthermore, business 
communities in AEs often collaborate to create supportive networks such as overseas 
Chambers of Commerce to facilitate relationships in a host economy (Keating, 1993). 
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To sum up, deficiencies in the munificence of the home environment translate into 
capability gaps of firms. Where knowledge-based resources are scarce, this scarcity 
constrains the creation of firm-specific capabilities. Where few senior managers have 
overseas experience, it is difficult to assemble an internationally experienced top 
management team; where business networks do not (yet) expand across national 
boundaries, growth within networks will be slow.  
Hypotheses: Location Choice of MNEs into AEs 
The home environment’s weaker resource munificence constrains the strategic options of 
EE MNEs relative to those of AE MNEs, and it translates into a relatively greater sensitivity 
to barriers to entry and sharper focus on exploiting potential advantages in the host 
economy. We develop hypotheses concerning the differential impact on AE and EE MNE 
location choices of four drivers, specifically two barriers to entry, namely weak property 
rights and home-host distance, and two attractors of FDI, namely the home country diaspora 
in the host economy, and host market size. 
Weak intellectual property rights as a barrier to entry 
An important barrier to entry for foreign investors is the need to learn how to operate within 
the institutional framework of the host country (Meyer et al., 2009). This includes tacit 
knowledge of not just formal rules, but of informal rules and practices of law enforcement 
(North, 1990). Within a given institutional framework, the protection of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) tends to be of particular concern to foreign investors (Khoury & Peng, 
2010; Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2004). The less clearly IPR are protected, and the less 
effectively such protection is enforced, the more foreigners have to rely on their own 
internal processes as well as informal means of engaging with local enforcement agencies 
(Benassy-Quere, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007).  This challenge tends to deter many foreign 
investors (Adams, 2010).  Hence, our baseline expectation for all MNEs is that the better 
IPR is protected in an economy, the more likely foreign investors choose to locate there.  
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Firms develop capabilities to manage and protect their knowledge. They may, for 
example, selectively transfer or compartmentalize knowledge, which enables sharing of 
proprietary knowledge across sensitive interfaces while appropriating the benefits of the 
knowledge (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Henkel, 2006). Moreover, internal processes 
enable experienced MNEs to tap into and transfer to headquarters knowledge from 
geographically dispersed subsidiaries (Kafouros, Buckley, & Clegg, 2012; Monteiro 2015). 
Such processes are supported by munificent home environments in which such knowledge 
can be shared in business networks and in which relevant skills can be easily recruited. 
They enable MNEs to protect against potential unauthorized knowledge diffusion, even in 
institutionally less developed contexts (Laursen & Salter, 2014).
3
  
EE MNEs operating in AEs have, compared to local competitors, a) weaker abilities of 
operating under AE institutional frameworks and b) less sophisticated managerial processes 
to protect their products and technologies internally. In their home country, they are used to 
different types of challenges in managing technologies, and IPR in particular. For example, 
they tend to operate at home with mature technologies that are easy to imitate, but for which 
the costs of the imitation are not very serious. In consequence, they have fewer human 
resources with the capability to manage, to protect and to exploit the sophisticated 
technologies that are available to them in AEs. We therefore expect that the deterrence of 
weak protection of IPR will affect EE MNEs more than AE MNEs. 
Moreover, a particular concern for EE MNEs in AEs is the control of technologies that 
they acquire with the take-over of local firms in strategic asset seeking investments (Rui & 
Yip, 2008; Li, Li & Shapiro, 2012). When EE MNEs acquire local firms with higher levels 
of technologies, they find it demanding to manage these technologies effectively and to 
prevent the uncontrolled diffusion of knowledge, for example when critical employees 
                                                 
3
 It might be argued that because MNE from EEs operate in business environments with weak IP 
protection, their experience would make it easier for them to expand internationally to countries with 
lower IP protection (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008, Del Sol and Kogan, 2007). However, note that 
our framework focuses solely on location choices in AEs. 
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leave an acquired company. This puts EE MNEs relatively more at the mercy of the legal 
framework, in particular the strength of IPR protection, in the host economy.  
EE MNEs also have less experience of managing processes of sharing knowledge 
within the organisation, especially in absorbing knowledge from overseas affiliates in AEs 
into the parent organization in an EE. Arguably, their ‘headquarter absorptive capacity’ 
(Ambos, et al., 2006) is comparatively weak, which in part is a consequence of home 
country munificence. Thus, they are less able to create processes to diffuse innovations 
internally, or to recruit staff who might lead knowledge sharing, while making it more 
difficult to prevent diffusion of the new technologies to potential competitors.
4
   
In summary, their inexperience in terms of capabilities for managing technology and 
innovation in AEs, and their relative disadvantages in sourcing the relevant skills, 
knowledge and experience in the home economy,  means that EE MNEs benefit from host 
environments whose legal systems offer better IPR protection. Hence, we suggest:  
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the host country’s protection of intellectual property, the 
more likely is an MNE is to locate in that AE. This effect will be stronger for EE 
MNEs than for AE MNEs.   
 
Home-host distance as a barrier to entry 
The geographic distance between an MNE’s home and host locations is usually argued to 
increase the costs of entering foreign markets and of doing business (Ghemawat, 2007; 
Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & Meyer, 2009; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russel, 2005). Moreover, 
national differences increase the extent of adaptation needed to reach consumers, and 
reduce the efficiency of interaction with (external) business partners and (internal) 
                                                 
4
 Again, this argument is different to the one that states that EE MNEs operating in other EEs are 
more easily able to function in host environments closer to their own, in terms of for example 
institutional voids than MNEs from AEs (Cuervo-Cazzuro & Ramamurti, 2014). The capabilities that 
EE MNEs have learnt from their home country institutional voids may well be valuable in other 
similar institutional contexts but are not likely to be relevant for investment in AEs. 
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employees. Thus, in general the greater the difference, the greater is the need for global 
leadership capabilities to manage increasingly complex interfaces. While distance may also 
offer some firms opportunities for arbitrage’ (Ghemawat, 2007), for companies at early 
stages of their internationalization, the costs of distance usually outweigh such potentialities 
(Johansen & Vahlne, 2009).  Hence, our baseline expectation is that all MNEs are less 
likely to invest in a country that is located at a greater distance from the home economy, 
but more likely where the same official language is spoken.  
However, the effect of distance on location decisions is critically moderated by 
international management capabilities available in the home economy. Certain costs of 
distance decline with the experiential knowledge held by or available to the management 
team (Kirca et al., 2012; Sambharya, 1996; Tan & Meyer, 2010). For example, 
internationally experienced managers know better how to manage diverse workforces, and 
how to adapt human resource systems to a workforce that is culturally or otherwise different 
from the parent organization. Moreover, being able to draw upon experience in diverse 
settings strengthens absorptive capacity of the parent organization and thus the ability to 
integrate knowledge potentially available in distant locations (Ambos et al., 2006; Kotabe et 
al., 2011).  
As we have argued above, international management capabilities tend to be scarce in 
EEs, and that applies even more to competences related to managing in contexts that are 
very different to what the top management is familiar with. EE MNEs face considerable 
challenges to recruit, prepare and manage managers able to take on leadership roles in 
subsidiaries that operate in very distant foreign locations (Arp, 2014; Meyer & Xin, 2018).  
Even in EEs, some individuals likely have experience of living or doing business in 
countries that are nearby or share a common language, for example through student travel, 
temporary work or au pairing. But as countries become more distant, the likelihood of these 
casual exchanges is reduced because the costs and the complexity of undertaking them 
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increase. Because people in EE have less experience engaging with countries that are more 
distant, it is harder to identify and recruit managerial talent with the relevant skills. This 
will raise the cost of operating in more distant locations, such that we suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: The less the distance between the home and host country, the more likely is 
an MNE to locate in that particular host country. This effect is stronger for EE 
MNEs than for AE MNEs.   
Diaspora reducing the liability of foreignness 
Populations within the host economy who have migrated from the investing country can 
help investors build bridges to the host economy and thus to reduce some barriers to entry 
(Javorcic, Özden, Spatareanu, Neagu, 2011; Saxenian, 2006). This is because successful 
FDI relies on good information about a huge variety of business issues in the host economy, 
which can be very expensive for potential entrants, whether from AEs or EEs, to gather and 
process, as emphasized by the notion of the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). 
However, the costs of obtaining and  processing this information can be reduced by 
migrants resident in the host economy who can act as a source of information and as a 
mechanism to interpret differences between the home and host economy in a manner that 
can be more easily assimilated by the investing MNE.  
To investigate this idea, a small literature has explored the links between FDI and the 
existence of ethnic networks in the host economy, and for the most part has confirmed its 
relevance empirically. For example, Kugler and Rappoport (2007) find that migration at one 
point of time is associated with a future increase in the level of FDI. Moreover, evidence 
from China, which has a large migrant diaspora, suggests a positive relationship between 
the numbers of ethnic Chinese in host country locations and FDI inflows (Tong, 2005). 
Thus, our baseline prediction is that migrant diaspora reduce the liability of foreignness for 
MNEs from AEs and EEs. 
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As argued above, the need for the provision of relevant host economy market 
knowledge is relatively greater for MNEs from EEs than AEs because their business 
ecosystems have fewer mature international business ties, and a relative shortage of 
expertise related to foreign markets. Thus, the liability of foreignness weighs more heavily 
upon them and their ability to compensate through other channels is weaker because of the 
lesser munificence of their home economy. This implies that the access and information 
provided by a diaspora of migrants is relatively more valuable to EE MNEs than to AE 
MNEs. This leads us to hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 3: The larger the diaspora from the MNE’s own country of origin, the more 
likely is an  MNE to locate in that AE. This effect is stronger for EE MNEs than 
for AE MNEs. 
Market attraction 
A primary motive for MNEs to expand internationally is access to overseas markets (Bevan 
& Estrin, 2004; Dunning, 1993; 1998; Nielsen Asmussen & Weatherall, 2017). In other 
words, firms expand overseas to exploit their resources and capabilities by selling their 
products and services to a wider range of customers. As market-seeking is the most 
common motive for FDI, the number of potential consumers is a major attractor for FDI. In 
other words, potential market size is driven by demographic factors (O’Neil, 2011; 
Townsend, Yeniyurt & Talay, 2009). Our baseline prediction is therefore that all MNEs are 
more likely to invest in countries with large markets, indicated in particular by large 
populations.  
Do these arguments apply with equal force to MNEs from AEs and EEs? Experience 
from competing successfully in their AE home market provides MNEs from AEs typically 
with sophisticated products, reputable brands and experience with high income distribution 
channels, all associated with markets for consumers with relatively high incomes (Dunning, 
1993, Townsend, et al., 2009). MNEs from AEs therefore typically occupy premium 
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segments and their strategies involve systematic product differentiation (Alcácer, et al., 
2013).  
In contrast, experience of competing in EEs provides EE MNEs with capabilities 
valuable in the price sensitive volume segments of AEs (Lessard, 2014; Brandl & 
Mudambi, 2014). Thus, EE MNEs tend to sell in volume markets where size in terms of 
potential consumers is more important than other market attractors (Bahadir, Bharadwaj & 
Srivastava, 2015). Their advantages of scale are more naturally transferable to large markets 
whereas customization for smaller markets incurs relatively higher costs for them. Hence, 
market size may be relatively more important to attract for EE MNEs than AE MNEs.  
Larger markets will likely also contain more heterogeneous population and therefore a 
wider variety of consumers. They therefore offer a greater spectrum of potential paths for 
product differentiation and market segmentation. Moreover, a greater variety of consumer 
preferences and tastes, of distribution channels and of geographic sub-segments offers more 
niches into which a foreign investor can gradually enter. This greater range of possibilities 
for market penetration therefore offers exposure to a wider variety of internationalization 
experiences and thus more learning opportunities for EE MNEs. 
Finally, a larger market is likely to host more incumbent firms, covering the numerous 
options for strategic variation, such that EE MNEs will also be able to learn from a greater 
diversity of local peers. For example, Haier, which entered the USA as an early foreign 
market (rather than smaller economies in Europe) argued that if it succeeded in the USA, it 
could build on that learning to succeed in other countries subsequently (Khanna, Palepu, 
Vargas, 2006). Subsequently, Haier entered other markets, including major acquisitions in 
New Zealand, Japan and in 2016 again the USA. In view of the greater emphasis of EE 
MNEs on scale and learning opportunities, we propose our hypothesis on host countries’ 
market attractiveness.  
16 
 
Hypothesis 4: The larger the number of potential customers in the host economy, , the 
more likely are MNEs to locate in this advanced economy. This effect is stronger 
for EE MNEs than for AE MNEs.   
Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. As is customary, we discuss alternative explanations 
and countervailing effects in the discussion section. 
 Insert Table 1 about here  
METHODOLOGY 
Data 
We constructed our own dataset of the locational choices of foreign investors from the 
Orbis database (Bureau van Dyck) combined with other variables. Orbis distinguishes 
between foreign and domestically owned firms and provides the home economy of the 
ultimate owner; the largest shareholder that is independent.
5
  We define a firm as being 
foreign owned when the (foreign) ultimate owner holds a direct or indirect participation of 
at least 50.01% of the stock.  We restrict our attention to firms that were incorporated after 
2005, so as to focus on investments that are comparable in terms of market conditions and 
institutional context.
6
 The dataset allows us to identify all firms operating in a given host 
economy owned by firms from any given source country, provided the subsidiary is of the 
minimum size to be included in the database.  
Our hypotheses are tested by considering differences in home country effects on 
locational choice between firms from AEs and EEs; hence our dataset must encompass 
MNEs originating from both. To construct this, we extracted data from Orbis for all MNE 
subsidiaries active in 2011 and established after 2005 that originated from one of the 
fourteen main actors in FDI; seven AEs (France, Germany, Spain, Japan, United Kingdom, 
                                                 
5
 If a largest shareholder is not independent, the ultimate owner is traced back again via the largest 
shareholder until an ultimate owner which is independent is finally identified.  
6
 We are including "all active companies and companies with unknown situation" in 2011. This 
excludes those companies incorporated after 2005 but closed before 2011. The latter filter helps in 
reducing the survival bias that would emerge if we included firms incorporated some time 
previously. 
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United States and Canada) and seven EEs (Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, 
Mexico, and Turkey). The chosen seven AEs generated about two thirds of global FDI from 
AEs, and the seven EEs around three fifths of all investment from EEs (UNCTAD 2016).  
We consider a wide range of AEs economies into which MNEs from these home 
economies invest. We included the European countries that are member of the OECD and 
the largest non-European economies that are member of the OECD. In total, we include the 
following 31 host countries in our dataset: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United 
States.  These countries received more than 80% of all FDI into AEs (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of our dataset and our empirical methodology.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Our hypotheses concern the relative importance of four groups of host economy 
characteristics influencing the choice of location by MNEs’ from AEs as against EEs. We 
are interested in the factors determining the choice of location for MNEs within a set of 
potential host economies and the appropriate methodology is therefore location choice 
modelling, which has been frequently applied in studies of FDI (Alcácer & Chung, 2014; 
Chang & Park, 2005; Disdier & Mayer, 2004; Head et al., 1995; Tan & Meyer, 2011). Our 
hypotheses are tested by investigating whether the coefficients on the determinants of 
location choice for MNEs from AEs are the same as those for MNEs from EEs.  
In our framework, firms are making choices about whether or not to invest (I) across a 
variety of host countries (h). The dependent variable, Ih, describes the probability of a given 
firm to invest in a potential host country, given the characteristics of this host country. The 
choice set of host economies for investing firms is restricted to AEs, which we 
operationalize as member countries of the OECD, excluding non-European members that 
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until recently were commonly classed as emerging economies (Chile, Mexico, Israel and 
Turkey).  Investing firms make their location choice according to the characteristics of the 
potential host countries discussed in our hypotheses (Ch) as well as a vector of control 
variables (X h).  
The traditional methodology in the literature on location choice is to use a 
conditional logit (C-Logit) to examine the determinants of location choice. This method is 
an extension of the multinomial logit model that was developed for models of choice 
behavior in which the explanatory variables include attributes of the choice alternatives 
(Maddala, 1983). In the C-Logit specification, the utility for each host-country alternative 
depends on the attributes of that alternative and not on the attributes of the firm, as is the 
case in the multinomial Logit. Crucially, this means that, in our model, the explanatory 
variables are at the host-country level and it is important to note that the C-Logit 
specification cannot directly accommodate firm-level or home-country level variables.
7
 
Under a type 1 extreme value distribution of the error term, the probability of choosing 
location h takes the following form (McFadden, 1984):  
Prob(Ih =  j|xh1,xh2,…….xhJ) = Prob(Ih =  j|Xh) = Phj = exp(x’hjβ)/Ʃi=1 exp(x
’
hjβ)   (1) 
where the x denotes the choice variables (Greene, 2011). The coefficient on each variable is 
then estimated by maximum likelihood. Thus, we estimate for each group of home 
economies a C-Logit equation of the form: 
Prob (Ih) = f( Ch, Xh).       (2) 
Note that the coefficients in this type of model reflect the characteristics of the choice 
alternative, in our case alternative locations. Thus, the coefficients reflect the attractiveness 
of locations to the firms in the respective samples (Alcácer & Chung, 2014; Tan & Meyer, 
2011).  
                                                 
7
 Unless home-country and firm variables are interacted with host-country variables. 
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We use two methods to test our hypotheses. First, we divide the sample into AEs and 
EEs and analyse the differences in the strength of effects (i.e. the size of coefficients) 
between the two sub-samples using a Hausman test. Second, we use the whole sample but 
interact our independent variables of relevance for our hypotheses with a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if the home economy is an EE and zero if it is an AE. The 
hypothesis is then tested according to the sign and significance of this interactive dummy. If 
the interaction term is significant and of the sign predicted in Table 1, then we conclude that 
the difference between EE MNEs and AE MNEs firms in the impact of the variable of 
interest on location choice is significant. In a post hoc analysis, using country specific 
datasets, we offer a more nuanced analysis in which the determinants are considered on a 
country by country basis across the set of EEs and AEs though of course the sample for 
each home country is much smaller.  
Measurements  
Our dependent variable captures the probability that a given firm chooses a particular host 
country from the available set of countries as the location for a subsidiary. Thus, for every 
possible firm-host country dyad, the dependent variable of investment location choice takes 
the value of 1 if the pertinent country is chosen by the firm, and zero for all other countries. 
Table 2 provides a description of the pattern of FDI flows in our sample. For example, 
based on the number of subsidiaries, Chinese MNEs invest most into Germany followed by 
Australia and Italy. Indian MNEs have the largest number of subsidiaries in Great Britain 
followed by Germany and the United States.
8
 
Table 2 about here 
Turning to the independent variables about which we hypothesize, for Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection (H1) we use the measure of intellectual property rights 
                                                 
8
 Note that our data refers to the number of subsidiaries from a specific home country, rather than 
their value. This may explain why the observed pattern is not always the same as indicated in the 
media, which tends to concentrate on particular large value acquisitions rather than the volume of 
investments. We return to this issue in the discussion section. 
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protection from the Heritage Foundation, 2007. H2 concerns distance, and in our main 
analysis we use geographic distance between the most populated cities in kilometers 
(thousands), sourced from the GeoDist database made available by Mayer and Zignano 
(2011). These data are widely used in international trade and migration research (e.g. 
Bernard & Redding, 2011; Chaney, 2014; Abel & Sander, 2014). H3 concerns the impact of 
migrant diaspora, which we proxy by the foreign born population, as a percentage of the 
host country population, in each host economy from each home economy in 2001 from 
OECD. Finally, market attraction (H4) is measured by the Population of the host country 
(Loree & Guisinger, 1995) in 2007 which we obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and introduced in 100,000s and logarithms to ensure normality.
9
 
As noted above we use two methods to test our hypotheses. First, we compare the 
coefficients on each of the variables of interest in sub-samples of EEs and AEs respectively; 
if for example the prediction in Table 1 is that EEs will be more strongly attracted by an 
independent variable, then we expect a positive significant difference between the relevant 
estimated coefficient in the EE and AE sub-samples. Second, using the whole sample, we 
create five interactive variables, one for each of the hypothesis independent variables 
multiplied by an EE dummy, which equals 1 if the firm’s ultimate owner parent is located 
in one of the EEs listed above. A prediction that EEs are more deterred than AEs by a host 
economy characteristic, would be supported if the coefficient on the interactive 
EE*independent variable term is negative and statistically significant. 
To ensure we are not falsely attributing effects to our independent variables caused by 
other phenomena, we include a large number of control variables in our regressions.
10
  First, 
we introduce GDP growth for the period 2007 to 2010, from the World Development 
                                                 
9
 The year 2007 was chosen to be midway through our sample period. 
10
 In alternative specifications, we include other indicators of institutional quality and governance, 
such as corruption, but due to high correlations between these indicators and property rights (which 
is also a proxy for institutional quality), we decided not to include them in the reported 
specifications. This problem has been widely reported in the literature (e.g. Estrin, Baghdasaryan. & 
Meyer, 2009). 
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Indicators as the growth potential of an economy is an important attractor of FDI (Navaretti 
& Venables, 2006; Bevan & Estrin, 2004). We follow earlier studies such as Fisch and 
Zschoche (2012) and Holburn and Zelner (2010) who use the multi-year average of GDP 
growth in each host economy, in our case over the years 2007 to 2010.   
We also introduce the GDP per capita of the host economy in 2007 (World Economic 
Outlook, IMF) to capture levels of development and host economy labor costs; ceteris 
paribus a given level of labor force skill will be less attractive in countries with higher 
income per capita.  We capture agglomeration effects (Alcacer & Chung, 2014; Tan & 
Meyer, 2011) by including the bilateral (between the relevant home and host economy) 
stock of FDI in 2004, in logs to address the non-normality of this distribution. We also 
control for trade openness using trade as percentage of GDP in 2007 from World 
Development Indicators. Furthermore, as suggested by the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) 
framework (Hall & Soskice, 2001), the extent of manufacturing activity may be an 
important indicator of the institutional structures and level of skill development amongst 
AEs. Hence we control for the extent of manufacturing activity in the host economy, 
measured as the share of manufacturing output in GDP and derived from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook. Given the importance of language patterns in shaping trade and 
investment (Clougherty & Grajek, 2008; Selmier & Oh, 2013), we control for common 
language, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if home and host countries have the 
same official language and 0 otherwise, using data from CEPII.   
We cluster the standard errors at the firm (subsidiary) level to correct for the presence of 
within cluster correlation. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the 
sample of host economies are reported in Table 3. 
 Table 3 about here  
The correlation matrix for the independent variables on the full sample allows us to 
consider potential collinearities (Table 4). For the most part, the correlation coefficients are 
22 
 
low, less than 0.3, which indicate that there is no serious multicollinearity issue in our 
estimating sample.
11
  
 Table 4 about here   
 Results  
We report our main results in Table 5, with coefficient estimates of the C-Logit model. We 
report the results of estimating our model for the EE and AE sub-samples respectively in 
the first two columns, along with the χ²-test of whether the coefficients of the hypothesized 
variables are significantly different. The final column reports the hypothesis test based on 
the full sample, with an interaction term between an emerging economy (EE) dummy and 
each of the hypothesized variables.   
Hypothesis 1 concerns the impact on inward investment of protection of intellectual 
property rights. As expected, we find in columns (1), (2) and (3) that stronger IPR 
protection increases the choice of a particular location by all MNEs. We are also able to 
confirm that the positive effects of stronger IPR are more marked on the location choice of 
firms from EE than AE. If we look at the AE as against the EE sub-samples in columns (1) 
against (2), the coefficients are very similar (0.004 for EE compared with 0.008 for AE) but 
both are strongly significant (with p-values of 0.000) and in fact the χ²-test indicates that 
stronger IPR protection is a slightly stronger attractor for AE than EE MNEs. The odds-
ratio help us to interpret the coefficient (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). A one-unit 
increase in the strength of IPR increases the odds of entry of an EE MNEs by 0.4% and of 
an AE MNE by 0.8%. 
When we use the full sample we find that the interaction term IPR*EE is significantly 
negative (p= 0.000) indicating that, all else equal, IPR protection matters less for EE firms 
than for AE firms. Thus our data provides at best mixed support for Hypothesis 1: strong 
                                                 
11
 However, the intellectual property rights variable has a correlation of 0.65 with GDP per capita. 
To address potential collinearity, we estimated our basic model excluding GDP per capita. The 
results with respect our hypotheses were not sensitive to these changes. 
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IPR attracts investors, but in the specification using the full dataset, it attracts AE firms 
relatively more than EE firms.  
Turning to Hypothesis 2, as predicted we find that greater (geographic) distance deters 
all MNEs, whether from AEs or EEs or using the full sample in column (3). Moreover, a 
comparison of columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 reveals that the deterrence effect is more 
marked for EEs (-0.523 as against -0.303) and the χ²-test confirms that these differences in 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level (Prob > χ²=0.000). The odds ratio is 
0.593 for EE MNEs and 0.739 for AE MNEs, meaning that the probability is reduced by 
40.7% in the case of EE MNEs but only by 26.1% in the case of AE MNEs. Hypothesis 2 
can also be tested by considering the sign and significance of the coefficient on the distance 
* EE interaction in the full sample estimates in column (3). It can be seen that as predicted 
the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000), indicating that the 
distance coefficient is significantly smaller in the EE sub-sample. This provides further 
support for Hypothesis 2.   
Our third hypothesis concerns the impact of the migrant diaspora on FDI location. As 
predicted, the proportion of the population in a host economy born in a home economy 
increases the likelihood that MNEs choose that location for their investment. Thus, the 
coefficient on foreign born populations is positive and significant in columns (1), (2), and 
(3) (p=0.000). However, the attraction of a migrant diaspora is more marked for EE than 
AE MNEs; the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) respectively are 0.680 against 0.139 and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (Prob > χ²=0.000). The odds ratios 
(Table A1) moreover tell us that a one percentage point increase in the share of foreign-
born population in a host country increases the odds of entry of an EE MNEs by 98%, 
against 15% for AE MNEs – a huge difference. 
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Turning to the test on the full sample in column (4), the coefficient on the foreign-born 
pop * EE term is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (p=0.000). Hence we 
find strong support for Hypothesis 3.  
Finally Hypothesis 4 concerns the attractiveness of markets, measured by market size.  
As predicted, all MNEs are attracted by large markets; the coefficient is positive and 
significant (with a p-value of 0.000) both in the sub-samples (columns (1) and (2) and in the 
full sample (column (3)). The positive effects are more marked for EE MNEs than AE 
MNEs. Thus, the coefficient on population is 0.633 for AEs as against 0.884 for EEs, with 
the difference in the coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% level (Prob > 
chi2=0.000). According to the odds ratio (Table A1), an increase of 1 unit of the log of 
population (i.e. a ten-fold increase e.g. from 1 million to 10 million), more than doubles the 
probability of entry in a host country in the case of EE MNEs (i.e. an increase of 142%) but 
less than doubles it in the case of AE MNEs (i.e. an increase of 88%.   
The interactive term population * EE is both positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level (with a p-value of 0.000). Thus the data also provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 4. 
The results from the control variables also conform to expectations. Countries that have 
a higher share of manufacturing attract more FDI. The coefficients on GDP growth and 
GDP per capita are positive. The agglomeration effects are also significant and positive; 
MNEs are more likely to locate in host countries where there has been already important 
FDI from their home countries in the past. Countries that are more open to trade also attract 
more FDI. FDI is attracted relatively more to economies in which the share of 
manufacturing and trade are higher. Finally, the impact of a common language between 
home and host economies is positive and significant for all firms.  
Supplementary Analyses 
Country-Specific Analyses 
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Our theoretical predictions were based on the typical features of EEs as home countries, but 
we are cognizant that each country may have idiosyncratic features. Therefore, we have 
explored to what extent our hypothesized effects hold true for MNEs from each home 
country when analysed in isolation. We are aware that this approach is subject to substantial 
noise in the data. Our theoretical analysis focuses on features that typically are associated 
with emerging economies, but that theory allows for country-specific effects that may 
deviate from the general patterns. Yet greater insights can be gained from the more fine 
grained analysis. Thus we re-estimate the regression equations of Table 5 for subsamples of 
MNEs from each home country. Naturally, the sample sizes are much reduced, such that 
standard errors may rise sharply in some cases and particular coefficient estimates may be 
unduly influenced by outliers. This makes some of the results hard to interpret. However, in 
the spirit of full disclosure, which is called for in view of claims that social sciences 
selectively report confirmatory evidence (Bettis et al., 2016; Hahn & Ang, 2017; Meyer et 
al., 2017), we report in Tables 6a and 6b the full results for MNEs from each home country.  
Table 6a and Table 6b about here 
Commencing with Hypothesis 1 on the effect of IPR, we find that as expected for AE 
MNEs the coefficients are mostly positive and significant with the exception of German 
MNEs, where it is significantly negative. In addition, it is negative, but insignificant for 
Spanish and French MNEs. Concerning EE MNEs, while the coefficients are mostly 
positive and significant (Brazil, India, South Africa and China), IPR protection is actually 
significantly negatively associated with FDI from two EEs, Russia and Turkey, and has no 
significant effect for Mexico. The fact that MNEs from two EEs are actually deterred by 
stronger host IPR, these being countries which themselves have a weak rule of law and 
property rights protection, explains why overall we only find at best mixed support for 
Hypothesis 1. A possible explanation for the two outliers, Russia and Turkey, is the 
hypothesis advanced by Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Del Sol and Kogan (2007), 
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among other authors, that capabilities in managing under institutional voids are part of the 
capabilities that MNEs from these two countries aim to exploit abroad.  
Geographic distance is a significant deterrent for all AE MNEs except for UK and 
Canadian MNEs, though the coefficients are often small. Geographic distance is also a 
major deterrent for some emerging markets, notably China, India and South Africa; the 
coefficient for China is more than 16! However, distance also actually significantly attracts 
MNEs from Russia and Brazil, and has no significant effect on location choice from 
Turkey. In the case of Brazilian MNEs, this reflects an affinity with Europe, and the 
Netherlands in particular (see Table 2); the case of Russian MNEs we discuss further 
below. Thus, the evidence suggests that the deterrence effect of distance applies in general, 
as proposed in Hypothesis 2, but can be offset by positive relations such as historical ties 
for specific countries.
12
 
At the country level, migrant diaspora are found to have a more marked positive effect 
on MNEs from EEs than AEs. MNEs from all EEs appear to be positively attracted to 
locations with larger migrant diaspora, as against MNEs from only four of seven AEs 
(significant at the 5% level for only three of them). Specifically, migrants have no FDI 
pulling power for MNEs from Japan and Canada and actually act to deter investments from 
the US and Spain. On the other hand, the coefficients are sometimes very large for EE 
MNEs, especially from Brazil, China and South Africa, but typically smaller for all AEs. 
This pattern is highly consistent with Hypothesis 3. The substantial variance in the impact 
of diasporas on AE MNEs than EE MNEs is presumably linked to culture and history, 
though the overall impact on EE MNEs is of course greater. 
Finally, a large population, and hence a large market, attracts MNEs from all EEs and 
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 In the country-specific regressions, the measures for distance and for common language are in 
some case correlated, which leads to counterintuitive results for some AE subsamples. In Germany 
and France, AEs with the same official language are neighboring countries, leading to a negative 
correlation, whereas in the case of the UK they are positively correlated as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and USA (but not Ireland) are far from the UK. 
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from all AEs. We confirm Hypothesis 4 because MNEs from some EEs are highly sensitive 
to market size, notably China, Brazil and India, while apart from France and the UK the 
lure of larger markets is less for AEs. On the other hand, Russian MNEs are least attracted 
by large markets.  
The main observation arising from this fine-grained analysis (in addition for the support 
for our hypotheses in most cases) is that Russian MNEs appear to diverge from the 
predictions of theory. We note that they are particularly attracted to Latvia and the Czech 
Republic (Table 2), neither of which scores particularly highly on any of the variables that 
we predicted to indicate an attractive host country. We interviewed experts on these 
countries, who suggested that Russian entrepreneurs are attracted to these two countries by 
a combination of, for them, favourable tax conditions, the presence of a Russian nouveau 
riche community and a substantial Russian speaking minority (Latvia) or similarities of 
Russian and the local language (in the Czech Republic). We conducted additional tests on 
the effect taxation but found corporate tax rates not to display the expected effect; 
presumably because the tax rates published in comparative databases do not adequately 
capture the specific conditions applying to nouveau riche diaspora.  
Alternative Measurements 
We have conducted a number of further tests to explore the robustness of the results. Most 
importantly, we use an alternative measure of distance, namely the cultural distance 
between home and host countries as measured using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
methodology based in four Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance).
13
  The results (reported in Table A.2 in Appendix) are 
broadly consistent with our main findings (Table 5), although the coefficient on IPR * EE is 
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 Cultural Distancegh = ∑ {(
4
𝑛=1 𝐼𝑛𝑔 − 𝐼𝑛ℎ)
2/𝑉𝑛}/4}where Ing is the index for the n
th
 cultural 
dimension in the home country of the foreign affiliate's group g and Inh corresponds to the index for 
the n
th
 cultural dimension in the foreign affiliate's i host country h. Vn is the variance of the index for 
the n
th
 cultural dimension. For the indices see Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and the 
Hofstede Center's website (http://geert-hofstede.com/ index.php). 
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positive, but not significant in the sample with all firms and interaction terms (4). Due to 
the well-known validity problems associated with this measure with respect to EEs (e.g. 
Estrin et al., 2009; Shenkar, 2001), we are not surprised by this result.  
 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Mixed Logit 
Underlying the distribution of the error term in the construction of the C-Logit model is 
the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). In other words, the 
property of this model is that the odds ratio of choosing between two locations is 
independent of the characteristics of any third location. This implies that the choices should 
therefore all be equally substitutable to the investor. However, if we think that some 
countries are closer substitutes than others, then this assumption might be violated.  
We performed a Hausman and McFadden (1984) test to check its validity of the IIA 
assumption; the test is based on the idea that if a subset of the decision choice set is 
irrelevant, its omission from the model will not systematically change the estimates.  
To that end, we first estimated the model on the full set of 31 host country alternatives 
and re-ran it on the subset of 30 alternatives (partial). We exclude alternatively three 
locations: the U.S., France and Great Britain. In the three cases we find that the IIA 
assumption is violated, perhaps unsurprisingly given these are very major economies. The 
results of the tests indicate that we could reject H0 at the 1% level, with a χ² statistic of 
respectively 15,115.98 (comparison full – partial ex-US), 3,751.41(comparison full – partial 
ex-France) and 2,784.13 (comparison full – partial ex-GB), indicating that the two sets of 
estimates (full vs partial) were statistically different in the three cases. 
There are several ways to address the problems caused by the violation of the IIA 
assumption, one of the most widely used of which is the use of a mixed logit. This resolves 
the limitations of standard logit by allowing for random taste variation, unrestricted 
substitution patterns, and correlation in unobserved factors over time (McFadden and Train, 
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2000). The firm faces a choice among J country-alternatives. The utility of firm n from host 
country h is specified as: 
𝑈𝑛ℎ = 𝛽′𝑛𝑥𝑛ℎ + 𝜀𝑛ℎ 
 where 𝑥𝑛ℎ are observed variables that relate to the alternative and decision-maker, 𝛽𝑛 is a 
vector of coefficients of these variables for firm n representing that firm’s tastes, and 𝜀𝑛ℎ is 
a random term that is iid extreme value. The coefficients vary over decision-makers in the 
population with density 𝑓(𝛽). This density is a function of parameters Ɵ that represent, for 
example, the mean and covariance of the 𝛽’s in the population. This specification is similar 
to that of the standard logit, except that 𝛽 varies over decision-makers (firms) rather than 
being fixed (Train, 2009). In our specification, the coefficients 𝛽𝑛 vary over firms but not 
over investments for each firm, namely: 
(1) Some variables have coefficients that are assumed to vary over firms, with an 
independent normal distribution with mean and standard deviation that are 
estimated. In other words, these coefficients can take either sign, as seen in our 
country-by-country regressions. We select the following variables to have random 
coefficients:  Common Language, GDP per capita, Manufacturing, and 
Agglomeration.  
(2) The other variables have coefficients that are assumed to be fixed (i.e. do not vary 
over firms). 
Table 7 about here 
The results are reported in Table 7, Column (1) for the mean of the coefficients and 
Column (2) for the standard deviation of the coefficient. It can be seen that our results using 
mixed logit are broadly consistent with our c-logit specification in Table 5. Conforming to 
expectations, the coefficient of Distance * EE is negative and significant, and the 
coefficients of foreign-born pop * EE and Population * EE are positive and significant. 
30 
 
However, similarly to our C-logit results, we find that the coefficient of IPR * EE is 
negatively significant. 
Regarding the random coefficients, the standard deviation enters significantly for 
common language and manufacturing, indicating that the random specification is indeed 
valid for these two variables. However, the standard deviations of the coefficient for GDP 
per capita and Agglomeration are not significant, indicating that the parameters of these two 
variables are not significantly dispersed around the mean; in other words, they are relatively 
fixed. Overall, we conclude that the results from these robustness tests confirm our main 
findings. 
DISCUSSION 
EE MNEs are different from AE MNEs, but these differences can be explained as a 
consequence of the lesser munificence of the business communities in their home 
economies. We have argued that the institutional development and resource endowment of 
the home country provide the foundation for firms to develop resources that they can deploy 
in their international operations. We thus incorporate the home environment as a factor 
influencing firms’ initial resources and their ability to accumulate international management 
capabilities. In particular, we propose that the lesser munificence of the country of origin in 
effect increases the liability of foreignness of MNEs from EEs seeking to enter AEs. In 
consequence, they are relatively more deterred by barriers to entry such as distance or weak 
protection of intellectual property rights. On the other hand, they are attracted than MNEs 
from AEs by positive characteristics of the host economy which can make up for their home 
country deficiencies, notably the size of a migrant diaspora and large and fast growing host 
economy markets. We have tested this framework with four hypotheses, and we find strong 
support for our arguments.  
Our analysis contributes to three important debates in the field of international business. 
The first debate concerns the nature of organizational capability building by firms chasing 
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international catch-up (Awate, et al., 2012; Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; Madhok & Keyhani, 
2012). Such a process of capability upgrading can follow a gradual pattern along the 
internationalization process model (Johansen & Vahlne, 2009), aspects of which have been 
observed in studies of EE MNEs (Buckley, et al., 2016; Kotabe & Kothari, 2016; Meyer & 
Thaijongrak, 2013). Our theoretical framework suggest an interdependence between the 
home country eco-system and a focal firm. Home country resource munificence provides a 
basis for the emergence of business ecosystems that help firms to create proprietary 
resources important in managing their international operations (Hobdari et al., 2017), and 
also to accelerate learning processes and to strengthen the absorptive capacity in corporate 
headquarters (Ambos et al., 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra and Rui, 2017; Kotabe et al., 2011). In 
consequence, MNEs from home countries that are relatively immature in terms of 
institutions and resource endowments are likely to be more deterred by barriers to entry and 
attracted by host economy characteristics such as migrant diaspora that reduce their 
obstacles to doing business internationally. 
Second, several studies of EE MNEs have highlighted the importance of strategic asset 
seeking investments (Cui & Aulakh, 2018; Cui, et al., 2014; Deng, 2009; Rui & Yip, 2008). 
Hence, recent theoretical work suggests that MNEs from EEs use FDI to create firm-
specific assets, rather than to exploit them (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010; 
Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). For example, advanced technologies or brand names acquired 
overseas might strengthen a firm’s competitive position vis-à-vis its competitors back home 
(Li, et al., 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007).  
We would expect strategic-asset seeking investors to be particularly attracted by 
protection of IPR in a host country, while the traditional model would put more emphasis 
on standard attractors and barriers, such as markets and distance. We find support for 
markets and distance to be more important for EE MNEs, and also greater sensitivity to IPR 
protection, at least in most EEs, which suggests that EE MNEs indeed pursue both types of 
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catch-up strategies. However, note that our control for technological sophistication, R&D as 
a share of GDP, has very similar negative coefficients for both EEs and AEs. This implies 
that the technological sophistication of the host economy acts as a barrier to all MNEs, 
presumably because it indicates the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of domestic 
competition.  Thus, strategic asset seeking investors FDI represents a theoretically 
interesting type of strategy, but it is only part of a bigger trend of EE MNEs catch up.  
Third, together, these contributions help to answer whether or not explaining the 
strategies of MNEs from EE requires new theories (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012). 
Some scholars argue that systematic differences in the investment process require new 
theories to explain the characteristics of EE MNEs (Child & Rodgrigues 2005; Guillén & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009; Mathews 2006; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014). In contrast, others propose 
that the established theories should not be prematurely abandoned since they retain the 
capacity to explain the principal features of EE MNEs (Hennart, 2009; Narula, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2012). Our take on this debate is that existing theories are quite powerful in 
explaining the pattern of location choices by EE MNEs, as long as the theoretical 
framework incorporates the relative weakness of international management capabilities as a 
consequence of resource munificence in these home economies.  
Extrapolating to the future, our theoretical analysis suggests that as EEs grow, their 
MNEs become more experienced in international management, such that the differences 
between AE and EE MNEs will decline. Our framework is thus consistent with the broader 
institutional voids framework (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Carney, van Essen, Estrin and 
Shapiro, 2017), in which business behavior in EEs become more similar to those in AEs as 
the level of institutional development rises. 
Empirical Limitations and Future Research 
One of the limitation of our approach is that although we can examine the “extensive 
margin” of FDI by analysing the decision of firms to invest in a foreign country, we are not 
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able to examine the “intensive margin” of FDI (volume of foreign affiliate sales), nor the 
volume or value of FDI flows. As such we can only tell one part of the FDI story, and this 
also limits our ability to draw policy conclusions in terms of the differential impact of EE 
MNEs and AE MNEs on the host economy. In particular, our framework does not capture 
the determinants of the small number of very large projects that often receive media or case 
study attention.  Scholars interested in the policy implications of FDI capital inflow 
volumes may thus want to study different dependent variables.  
Another limitation of our approach is that we are only considering majority owned FDI 
but not minority equity stakes. This means that if the economic or institutional 
characteristics of certain host countries made them more likely to receive minority 
investments – a common concerns when EEs are considered as host countries – then these 
characteristics might interact with the likelihood of investing and cause selection biases. We 
chose 50% as cut-off because lower cut-offs bring into the study non-strategic (i.e. 
financial) investors as well as substitution effects with non-equity modes of serving foreign 
markets, which complicate the theoretical framing of the study. Future research may thus 
further explore investments into minority ventures. 
Moreover, the choice set in our study is limited to 31 OECD countries. This represents 
wide variety for business research, and covers the locations most relevant to our research 
question, i.e. the anomaly of FDI against the traditional flow of capital from advanced to 
developing countries. However, FDI between different EEs (so called ‘South-South’ FDI) 
also entails interesting questions, highlighted for example by Chinese investment in Africa 
(Li et al., 2015; Ramasamy et al., 2012). Future research may thus investigate in addition 
the locational determinants of South- South FDI.    
Further limitations arise from the database of the Bureau van Dyck itself. This database 
covers all firms registered in the respective country and obliged to publish their financial 
reports. However, while the database is commonly used in international business research 
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(e.g. Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003; Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2012), the reporting 
requirements vary slightly across countries, for example for minimum size threshold for 
inclusion. This bias can affect cross-country comparisons, but as it is not systematically 
related to our explanatory variables, it would not affect our results.   
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings have implications for managers of MNEs from AEs and from EEs as well 
as for policy makers in EEs. Managers of MNEs in AEs are becoming increasingly aware of 
competitors from EEs in their markets (Accenture, 2008). High profile examples include 
Haier or Beko in white goods, Huawei or ZTE in telecoms; Embraer and COMAC in 
aircraft; and Lenovo and Xiaomi in mobile phones. EE MNEs have also been buying 
Western brands and competing in developed markets; for example, Indian Tata (Jaguar 
Land Rover, Tetley Tea); Chinese Geely in cars (London Taxi, Volvo, Lotus) and Turkish 
Ulker in confectionary (Godiva, United Biscuits).  However, AE firms for the most part 
remain somewhat complacent about their ability to counteract threats from these new 
competitors (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), perhaps because they view these new entrants as 
niche players without global strategy (Guillén & Garcia-Canal, 2013).       
Our research warns against complacency on this score. Our theoretical framework 
suggests that differences between AE and EE MNEs in terms of their international 
investment strategies will gradually diminish as EE MNEs build resource munificence in 
their home business environments and from this develop capabilities and skills in 
internationalisation. We argue that currently observed differences in strategies and behavior 
arise primarily from differences in home country resource munificence. Consequently, we 
predict that these differences will diminish as EEs become more advanced. Hence, AE 
MNEs will face ever increasingly competitive environments at home or in similar 
economies and need to address in their strategizing the disruptive effects of new 
competitors from EEs. 
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Second, for EE MNE managers the main implication is to be clear about their own 
limitations. Specifically, they likely are limited by the quality and availability of the 
resources they can draw upon in their home business ecosystem. Our theoretical arguments 
suggest that managers should develop their strategies for internationalization with this in 
mind; they should seek to build resources to overcome home country deficiencies, working 
within local ecosystems. They should specifically focus on developing absorptive capacity 
for international experiences in order to counter the impact of home country immaturity.  A 
major aspect of this would be a forward looking talent management strategy that addresses 
future leadership challenges (Meyer & Xin, 2018). 
Third, experience from Japan, Korea, Singapore and others shows that government 
policy frameworks may play a helpful role in developing a more munificent business 
environment that eventually supports international competitiveness (Wade, 1990). In these 
countries, institutions were put in place to build human capital and organizational 
capabilities to assist firms in their internationalization process. These might include 
embassies providing commercial information, facilitating the creation of Chambers of 
Commerce abroad, or building education in areas such as foreign languages, culture studies, 
and cross cultural management.   
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Figure 1: Home Country Context, Business Ecosystem and Firm Strategies 
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Figure 2: Structure of the dataset 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses  
Hypotheses 
 direct effect differences 
IP protection  (H1) positive stronger positive for EE MNEs 
Distance  (H2) negative  stronger negative for EE MNEs 
Diaspora (H3) positive  stronger positive for EE MNEs 
Markets (H4) positive stronger positive for EE MNEs 
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Table 2:  Share of investments from host countries in outward investors from EE countries 
 
investing in... Brazil China India Mexico Russia Turkey South Africa 
AT 8.5% 0.8% 1.6% 1.8% 1.7% 1.3% 1.3% 
AU 1.8% 14.9% 7.5% 0.9% 0.2% 0.5% 25.7% 
BE 0.8% 0.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 
CA 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CH 2.6% 0.9% 3.4% 5.5% 0.7% 1.6% 3.1% 
CZ 0.5% 3.4% 3.9% 14.6% 33.1% 11.6% 1.5% 
DE 5.5% 38.5% 17.8% 10.0% 16.4% 46.3% 11.4% 
DK 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 
EE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% 1.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
ES 4.4% 0.9% 2.9% 12.7% 0.1% 0.7% 1.0% 
FI 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
FR 0.8% 1.4% 1.5% 0.0% 0.1% 4.9% 1.3% 
GB 5.4% 4.1% 22.0% 4.6% 0.7% 1.5% 30.8% 
GR 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
HU 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
IE 0.2% 2.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.4% 0.1% 2.4% 
IT 5.3% 11.5% 4.3% 7.3% 1.5% 3.8% 1.3% 
JP 0.2% 0.6% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
KR 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
LU 2.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 1.5% 
LV 0.8% 2.2% 3.7% 4.6% 37.3% 9.6% 0.9% 
NL 39.6% 10.8% 10.3% 5.6% 0.9% 4.8% 9.1% 
NO 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NZ 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
PL 0.2% 1.0% 1.7% 5.6% 0.2% 2.2% 3.7% 
PT 14.7% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
SE 0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
SI 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 
SK 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 0.0% 4.4% 8.5% 0.0% 
US 5.3% 3.0% 11.1% 24.6% 0.1% 0.9% 1.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: dark (blue) shading: top 3 host countries (rows) in the given source country (columns); 
medium (green) shading: host country accounts for more 3% of FDI from source country, but is 
not top 3; light (yellow) shading: host country accounts for less than 3% of FDI from source 
country.  
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Table 3: Sample Statistics 
 
    Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sample with all firms. N=1,644,226 
IPR Protection 77.774 16.117 50.000 90.000 
Distance 7.896 1.091 5.570 9.883 
Foreign-born population 0.459 1.176 0.000 9.800 
Population 16.062 1.476 12.649 19.523 
GDP Growth  0.558 1.587 -2.942 4.364 
GDP per capita 36.231 18.885 9.091 87.773 
Agglomeration 6.664 5.148 -12.979 13.160 
Trade openness 102.144 58.672 27.959 336.251 
Manufacturing 16.378 5.213 9.113 25.961 
Common language 0.122 0.328 0.000 1.000 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix. Sample with all firms 
 
 (obs=1,641,079) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 IPR protection 1.000                   
2 Distance 0.097 1.000         
3 Foreign-born population 0.099 -0.133 1.000        
4 Population -0.107 0.093 -0.124 1.000       
5 GDP Growth  -0.025 0.045 -0.060 0.111 1.000      
6 Common language 0.259 0.009 0.438 0.046 0.108 1.000     
7 GDP per capita 0.651 -0.052 0.073 -0.250 0.107 0.184 1.000    
8 Manufacturing -0.188 -0.170 -0.139 0.090 0.196 -0.137 -0.370 1.000   
9 Agglomeration 0.061 -0.189 0.133 0.312 0.046 0.268 0.057 0.042 1.000  
10 Trade openness 0.036 -0.262 0.087 -0.573 0.159 0.032 0.284 0.155 0.027 1.000 
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Table 5: Determinants of location choice  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EE MNE AE MNE Test of difference 
of coefficients Χ2 
ALL 
     
Intellectual property rights 0.004 0.008 8.56 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Distance -0.523 -0.303 48.59 -0.306 
 (0.031) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Foreign-born population 0.680 0.139 4017.61 0.130 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Population 0.884 0.633 244.70 0.722 
 (0.013) (0.010)  (0.007) 
IPR  EE    -0.005 
    (0.001) 
Distance  EE    -0.885 
    (0.025) 
Foreign-born pop  EE    0.318 
    (0.007) 
Population  EE    0.164 
    (0.008) 
GDP Growth 0.162 0.002  0.032 
 (0.009) (0.004)  (0.004) 
GDP per capita 0.003 -0.001  0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) 
Agglomeration 0.013 0.084  0.037 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002) 
Trade openness 0.010 0.009  0.010 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Manufacturing 0.158 0.027  0.045 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Common Language 1.469 0.170  0.302 
 (0.054) (0.015)  (0.014) 
     
Observations 401,110 1,215,284  1,616,394 
Pseudo R2 0.304 0.099  0.143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
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Table 6a – Determinants of location choice – Country by country regressions. Emerging Economies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Brazil China India Mexico Russia Turkey South Africa 
        
IPR protection 0.052 0.016 0.034 -0.010 -0.036 -0.060 0.106 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.016) (0.003) (0.011) (0.021) 
Distance 3.826 -16.369 -2.209 0.226 2.303 0.435 -7.571 
 (0.490) (0.522) (0.184) (1.240) (0.116) (0.305) (1.092) 
Foreign-born population 13.654 6.486 0.452 0.475 1.217 1.172 5.561 
 (1.480) (0.193) (0.198) (0.420) (0.025) (0.175) (1.663) 
Population 1.221 2.935 0.795 0.958 0.455 1.055 1.375 
 (0.092) (0.103) (0.056) (0.152) (0.039) (0.079) (0.163) 
GDP Growth -0.174 -0.137 0.101 0.064 0.109 0.045 0.607 
 (0.039) (0.013) (0.040) (0.097) (0.020) (0.035) (0.116) 
GDP per capita -0.021 0.012 -0.025 0.025 0.027 0.017 -0.020 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) 
Agglomeration -0.149 -0.287 0.180 -0.018 0.099 0.156 -0.044 
 (0.027) (0.015) (0.033) (0.026) (0.019) (0.046) (0.022) 
Trade openness 0.022 0.040 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.015 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Manufacturing -0.062 -0.064 -0.036 0.149 0.582 0.177 -0.051 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.052) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) 
Common Language -2.953  0.491 2.134   -0.390 
 (0.669)  (0.124) (0.396)   (0.547) 
        
Observations 10,296 107,436 34,749 2,225 216,580 18,876 10,948 
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.363 0.221 0.271 0.494 0.421 0.357 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
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Table 6b – Determinants of location choice – Country by country regressions. Advanced Economies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Germany Spain France UK Canada US Japan 
        
IPR protection -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.017 0.052 0.022 0.020 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) 
Distance -0.636 -1.453 -1.167 0.306 0.142 -0.148 -7.506 
 (0.021) (0.098) (0.035) (0.016) (0.119) (0.045) (0.627) 
Foreign-born population 1.012 -1.231 1.551 0.818 0.037 -5.072 -1.479 
 (0.026) (0.261) (0.059) (0.016) (0.968) (0.255) (1.044) 
Population 0.182 0.694 2.021 1.968 1.116 0.677 0.808 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.079) (0.030) (0.072) (0.045) (0.085) 
GDP Growth -0.068 0.044 0.049 -0.123 0.005 0.024 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.011) (0.009) (0.034) (0.009) (0.034) 
GDP per capita -0.023 -0.018 0.026 0.040 -0.021 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Agglomeration 0.300 0.052 -0.796 -0.591 -0.201 0.216 0.312 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.046) (0.017) (0.043) (0.028) (0.043) 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.027 0.012 0.013 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Manufacturing -0.018 0.107 0.078 -0.010 -0.052 0.027 -0.052 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) 
Common Language -0.215  -0.886 -3.481 0.557 1.877  
 (0.037)  (0.092) (0.081) (0.148) (0.068)  
        
Observations 298,508 45,696 174,468 285,712 25,956 343,448 41,496 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.212 0.194 0.161 0.176 0.172 0.214 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
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Table 7 – Robustness Tests 
 
 
  Mixed Logit 
  (1) (2) 
  Mean of Std. Dev. 
VARIABLES  coefficient Of coeff. 
    
IPR protection  0.005  
  (0.001)  
Distance  -0.295  
  (0.008)  
Foreign-born population  0.244  
  (0.010)  
Population  0.819  
  (0.008)  
IPR  EE  -0.005  
  (0.001)  
Distance  EE  -0.441  
  (0.041)  
Foreign-born pop  EE  0.298  
  (0.012)  
Population  EE  0.064  
  (0.009)  
GDP Growth  0.014  
  (0.004)  
Trade openness  0.009  
  (0.000)  
GDP per capita  -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Agglomeration  0.035 0.011 
  (0.003) (0.017) 
Manufacturing  0.043 0.291 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Common Language  -0.686 2.883 
  (0.115) (0.216) 
    
Observations  1,616,394 1,616,394 
Pseudo R2    
LR chi2  7031.18  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A.1 – Odds Ratios 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES EE AE 
IPR protection 1.004 1.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance 0.593 0.739 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
Foreign-born population 1.975 1.149 
 (0.013) (0.006) 
Population 2.421 1.882 
 (0.030) (0.019) 
GDP Growth 1.176 1.002 
 (0.011) (0.004) 
Common Language 4.345 1.185 
 (0.233) (0.018) 
GDP per capita 1.003 0.999 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufacturing 1.171 1.027 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Agglomeration 1.014 1.088 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Trade openness 1.010 1.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 401,110 1,215,284 
R2 0.305 0.099 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 
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Table A.2 - Robustness test: Cultural Distance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EE MNE AE MNE Test of 
difference of 
coefficients Χ2 
ALL 
     
IPR protection 0.003 0.002 0.78 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Cultural Distance -0.140 -0.111 5.63 -0.094 
 (0.011) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Foreign-born population 0.717 0.097 5800.09 0.103 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Population 0.786 0.442 529.02 0.597 
 (0.011) (0.010)  (0.006) 
IPR  EE    0.001 
    (0.001) 
Cultural Distance  EE    -0.146 
    (0.011) 
Foreign-born pop  EE    0.415 
    (0.006) 
Population  EE    0.128 
    (0.006) 
GDP Growth 0.164 -0.005  0.029 
 (0.009) (0.004)  (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.007 -0.003  0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) 
Agglomeration 0.024 0.168  0.070 
 (0.002) (0.006)  (0.002) 
Trade openness 0.009 0.008  0.010 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Manufacturing 0.175 0.036  0.061 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Common Language 1.289 0.104  0.274 
 (0.053) (0.016)  (0.015) 
     
Observations 386,117 1,169,962  1,556,079 
Pseudo R2 0.301 0.087  0.129 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
